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Abstract— Multihop wireless hotspot network [1]–[4]
has been recently proposed to extend the coverage area of
a base station. However, with selfish nodes in the network,
multihop packet forwarding cannot take place without an
incentive mechanism. In this paper, we adopt the “pay for
service” incentive model. i.e., clients pay the relaying nodes
for their packet forwarding service. Our focus in this paper
is to determine a “fair” pricing for packet forwarding.
To this end, we model the system as a market where the
pricing for packet forwarding is determined by demand
and supply. Depending on the network communication
scenario, the market models are different. We classify
the network into four different scenarios and propose
different pricing mechanisms for them. Our simulation
results show that the pricing mechanisms are able to guide
the market into an equilibrium state quickly. We also show
that maintaining communication among the relaying nodes
is important to achieve a stable market pricing.
Index Terms— Multihop wireless hotspot network,
incentive engineering, network pricing, hill-climbing,
marginal cost, VCG mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a multihop hotspot network as illustrated
in Figure 1. In this architecture, a mobile client may
not be able to reach the base station (BS) via single-
hop direct communication. Instead, the client must rely
on another node who is closer to the BS to forward
its packets. Such nodes are called the relaying nodes
(RN). This is the multihop wireless hotspot network
proposed in recent literatures [1]–[4]. A similar multihop
architecture for cellular network has also been proposed
recently [5]–[9].
Compared to the traditional single-hop hotspot net-
work where every node communicates directly to the
BS, a multihop hotspot network offers a few advantages.
First, it extends the coverage of the BS to a larger area,
which is helpful especially when installing additional BS
is not possible due to real property restrictions. Second, it
may increase the throughput of a client who receives very
bad signal from the BS, while a nearby relaying node
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Fig. 1. Example of a Multihop Wireless Hotspot Network
has much better wireless signal quality. This situation
is possible considering the irregular signal propagation
property in a physical environment with partitions and
obstacles. Finally, by multihop forwarding, a client does
not need to have subscription to the BS to use its service.
This is helpful when a client roams outside its own
hotspot ISP’s service area.
In this paper, we focus on providing incentive for
packet forwarding in a two-hop hotspot network. 1
Since packet forwarding consumes a RN’s resources
such as bandwidth and energy, a selfish RN would
not be willing to forward other’s packets without an
incentive mechanism. In this paper, we adopt the “pay
for service” incentive model, i.e., clients pays the RNs
to forward their packets. In human society, monetary
rewards are often given for providing service. Here,
packet forwarding can be considered as RN’s “service”
to the clients, considering the fact that the RNs are owned
and controlled by human users.
Our focus in this paper is to determine a “fair” pricing
for the packet forwarding service in this network. To
this end, we model the system as a market where the
pricing for packet forwarding is determined by demand
and supply. The RNs compete for clients’ traffic; clients
can choose a RN who can offer a better price, similar to
1We choose two-hop instead of the general N-hop architecture due
to its simplicity and its common and practical use.
2in a multiple-buyer multiple-seller market. Its difference
with the conventional market is that the communication
scenarios in this network can be very complex, leading
to different market structures.
The market structure in this network depends on the
number of RNs, the communication among the RNs,
and the reachability of the clients to the RNs. For
example, if there is only one single RN in the network,
the RN becomes a monopolist who has unique pricing
power. Therefore, the RN can probe the client(s) with
different prices to maximize its profit. However, if there
are multiple RNs, such pricing power is rather limited.
Instead, the RNs have to compete with each other by
undercutting each other’s price. Therefore, we classify
the network into four different scenarios and propose
different pricing mechanisms for them (details in Section
III). In particular, we introduce a hill-climbing algorithm
for a monopoly market (i.e. single RN in the network),
and a second lowest marginal cost pricing mechanism
for a market with multiple RNs and perfect reachability.
We further extend these basic network scenarios to cover
a situation where a client can only reach a subset of
the relaying nodes, and another situation where the
relaying nodes do not have communication among them.
A summary of the scenarios and their solutions are given
in Table I (Section III).
Our contributions in this paper are as follows: 1)
we classify the multihop hotspot network into different
communication scenarios and propose different market
pricing mechanisms for them; 2) we introduce a VCG-
like second lowest marginal cost mechanism which guar-
antees truthful reporting of costs; and 3) we demonstrate
the importance of keeping communication among the
RNs for a stable market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present backgrounds and concepts of a
market in micro-economics. In Section III we discuss in
detail the network scenarios and their market structures.
This is followed by evaluations of our solutions in
Section IV. We discuss the related work in Section V
and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTS
In this section we present backgrounds and some
related concepts of a market in micro-economics.
A. Incentive for Packet Forwarding in MANET
Creating incentive for packet forwarding is an impor-
tant problem in a multi-hop ad hoc network (MANET).
There are two general approaches: game theory based
approach [10]–[16] and credit (or micro-payment) based
approach [17]–[20]. In game theory approach, a packet
forwarding game is designed and played by all the nodes
in the network. In early studies [10]–[13], each node is
ranked with a reputation based on its packet forwarding
behavior observed by other nodes in the same neighbor-
hood. A node with bad reputation is then refused service
by other nodes, and hence isolated from the network. If
the cost of a bad reputation is prohibitively high, all
the nodes will choose to cooperate. Recent studies [14]–
[16] examine the forwarding dependency in the packet
forwarding game. For example, in [14] the concept
of a dependency graph is introduced to represent the
forwarding dependency of a node to another. When there
are mutual dependencies between two nodes, the packet
forwarding game can be modeled as a repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, where a simple “tick-for-tack” strategy
can be implemented to encourage mutual cooperation
[14]–[16]. The dependency requirement means that, a
node’s cooperative behavior can be enforced only when
its non-cooperative behavior can be “punished” by the
nodes that it has previously refused to serve for. If there
is no such mutual dependency, cooperation cannot take
place.
In our multihop hotspot network (Fig. 1), forwarding
dependency clearly does not exist since packet forward-
ing is always one-way, i.e., from the clients to the base
station. Therefore, the game theory approach cannot be
used in this network. Therefore, we adopt the credit
(micro-payment) approach where the clients pay the RNs
for their forwarding service. One important problem is
how to determine a “fair” pricing for packet forwarding.
To this end, we model the forwarding service as a market
where the market pricing is determined by the demand
of the clients (“buyers”) and the competition between
the RNs (“sellers”).
B. Demand Curve
The demand of a product in a market is related to its
price. When the price is low, the demand is high. This
relation can be captured by a function called demand
curve. Fig. 2 is an example of a demand curve called the
modified iso-elastic demand curve. It has the following
mathematical definition:
   

 
(1)
where   is the price,  is the demanded quantity, and
 is the reciprocal of the maximum price obtainable
(or upper-bound of price) when production tends to go
to zero. This demand curve has been used in economic
research and is considered to be quite realistic [21].
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Fig. 2. A modified iso-elastic demand curve.
In our market, the price is the reward for forwarding
one unit of traffic (i.e. $/Byte). The demand is measured
by the amount of traffic a client is requesting (i.e. Bytes).
When the price is low, the client demands more traffic.
Note that the demand curve is private to the client, and
the client is not willing to reveal this curve to the RNs.
C. Marginal Cost
Packet forwarding incurs a cost to the RN. Marginal
cost (MC) is defined as the cost of offering the next
unit of service to the clients. This may include hotspot
subscription cost, computer equipment, etc. This cost
may also include a variable part depending on the level
of battery power left on the mobile device. For example,
assume a user’s monthly hotspot subscription fee is $50
and the monthly equipment cost is $50. The traffic that
can be forwarded in a month can be estimated as: 30 days
* 5 hours * 3600 seconds * 100 Kbps. Then, the fixed
part of MC of forwarding one byte of data is:    
($/Byte). At the same time, the variable part of MC may
depend on the power left on the device. For example,
when power is below 50%, the user may attach $1 cost
to the depletion of power. The 50% power can sustain 1
hour of operation during which 3600 seconds * 100 Kbps
data can be sent. Then, the variable part of the MC when
power is low can be estimated as:       ($/Byte),
and the total MC becomes:       ($/Byte). If the
power is even lower (e.g. 10%), the traffic that can be
forwared is smaller and hence the MC for each packet is
higher. Since the change of battery is gradual, we expect
the MC of each RN to be relatively stable.
Clearly, each RN has its own valuation of resources.
Therefore, their MCs are likely to be different. In our
market model, each RN is free to determine its own MC
for packet forwarding.
D. Monopoly and its Profit Maximization
A monopoly is defined as a market in which there
is only one seller. This corresponds to the situation
where there is only one RN in the network. Since the
monopolist has unique pricing power in the market, it
will try to find an optimal price to maximize its profit.
The monopolist can derive its optimal price as follows.
Assume the marginal cost is  and the market’s demand
curve 2 is defined in Eq. 1. The monopolist’s profit
function can be computed as:
 	  	      	      

 
  (2)
If the demand curve is known, the monopolist can
compute an optimal price  based on the profit function.
3 However, since the demand curve of the market is not
known by the RN, a closed form computation of the
optimal price is not possible. Just “ask” the clients would
not be very helpful since the clients have incentive to lie
about the demand curve to gain advantage.
In our model, we let the RN probe the client(s) to
determine the optimal price, using a specially designed
hill-climbing algorithm which is quick and accurate
(details in Section III-B).
E. Price Undercutting and Second Lowest MC
When there are multiple RNs in the network, they
may engage in a “price war” to undercut each other. To
illustrate this, let’s consider a simple example with three
RNs with marginal costs: 


 


 

. Assume that
initially the price is higher than 

, and it is gradually
reduced due to price competition. When the price is
reduced to 

 , the third RN quits the market because
it has negative profit at this price. Likewise, the second
RN quits the market when the price is reduced to 

 .
At this point, since the first RN has nobody to compete
against, it does not have to reduce its price any further
(i.e. below 

 ). Therefore, the final result of this
competition is that, the RN with the lowest MC wins
the competition, with a market price equal to the second
lowest MC. In the example above, the first RN wins the
competition with a price equal to 

(the second lowest
MC).
To accelerate this competition, we let the RNs an-
nounce their MCs to the market, and set the final price
at the second lowest MC without going through the
lengthy price undercutting process. One problem with
this pricing mechanism is that the RNs may “cheat” by
announcing a false marginal cost. Based on a similar
proof of the Vickrey auction, we show that the second
lowest MC pricing mechanism is able to encourage the
RNs to report their marginal costs truthfully (details in
Section III-C).
2The market’s demand curve is determined by the aggregate of the
clients’ demands under different prices.
3A simple calculation gives   
 
 

.
4III. NETWORK SCENARIOS AND THEIR PRICING
SOLUTIONS
In this section we describe in detail the network
scenarios and their market structures. We then propose
different pricing solutions for these markets.
A. Network Scenarios and Market Structures
We classify the network into four different scenarios
(shown in Table I). Their differences are: 1) the number
of RNs in the network; 2) whether communication exists
among the RNs; and 3) whether the clients can reach all
RNs or only a subset of them. We relax these conditions
one by one from the first scenario (S1) to the last one
(S4).
Each of these scenarios leads to a different market
structure. S1 depicts a simple monopoly market where
the RN probes the market to maximize its profit. S2 is
a simple competitive market where a client can choose
service from every RN, and the RNs are aware of each
other’s price announcements. As mentioned earlier, we
adopt the VCG-like second lowest marginal cost pricing
mechanism to avoid lengthy price undercutting and to
encourage truthful reporting of marginal costs. In S3,
since a client can only reach a subset of the RNs, we
extend the second lowest marginal cost mechanism to
cover only those RNs a client can reach, and introduce a
mechanism to prevent false claims of reachability by the
clients. In S4, since the RNs now do not have information
about each other’s costs, a concurrent probing method
is used by each RN to determine its optimal price. We
investigate the price in equilibrium and show that in or-
der to have a stable market, maintaining communication
among the RNs is very important.
B. Scenario 1
In this scenario, there is only one single RN (monopo-
list) who probes the client(s) to maximize its profit. Here
we propose a quick converging hill-climbing algorithm
for this purpose.
The goal of the hill-climbing algorithm is to search an
optimal price  such that the RN’s profit is maximized.
If the profit function  		 as defined in Eq. 2 is a
correct representation of the market, RN’s profit should
increase monotonically to its maximum and decreases
monotonically after that, i.e., it has a single “peak”. 4
Although it is almost impossible to determine the exact
shape of the demand curve and profit function, we can
4This can be proved by the first-order derivative of the profit
function:         

 
 , which shows that its sign switches
only once when     .
reasonably assume that the profit function of the RN has
a single peak. To this end, our hill-climbing algorithm
is a general search algorithm for this type of function.
Our algorithm consists of two stages. The first stage
performs a coarse but quick probing to locate a price
region where  should belong to. The RN starts from a
probing price equal to its marginal cost, and the incre-
mental step size is always doubled each time to quickly
encompass the optimal price. The first stage produces
a relatively large target price region that includes the
optimal price. In the second stage, the RN conducts a
binary search within the target price region from the
first stage to quickly narrow down the price region, by
comparing the mid-point of the region with the two end-
points of the region. The algorithm stops when the target
price region is smaller than a pre-set accuracy threshold.
Details of the algorithm and an illustrative example are
given in Appendix I, which shows the fast probing (first
stage) and quick converging (second stage) properties of
our algorithm.
C. Scenario 2
In this scenario, there are multiple RNs in the network
and they are aware of each other’s price announcements.
This is possible by broadcasting the announcement mes-
sages, or if that is not reliable enough, by BS’s help
to relay those messages. By definition, every RN can
communicate with the BS.
As mentioned earlier in Section II-E, in this market
the RNs engage in a price war to undercut each other’s
price. The RN with the lowest MC wins the competition.
The charging price is set at the price of the second
lowest MC. To accelerate this competition, we let the
RNs announce their MCs to the market, and the final
market price is set at the second lowest MC.
This pricing mechanism is similar in principle to the
seal-bid second-price Vickrey auction [22], where the
seller collects bids from the buyers, and sells the good
to the highest bidder with a price equal to the second
highest bid. In this auction, the optimal strategy for each
bidder is to bid her true valuation for the good. Vickrey
auction is closely related to the Clark-Groove mechanism
[23], [24] in allocating public goods. Together they
are often known as the “VCG mechanism”, which has
influenced the field of mechanism design in distributed
agents (e.g. [25]).
The second lowest MC pricing mechanism can be con-
sidered as a “reversed” auction where the RNs (“sellers”)
compete for the clients (“buyers”). Similar to Vickrey
auction, we show that the RNs have incentive to report
their MCs truthfully under this pricing mechanism.
5TABLE I
NETWORK SCENARIOS AND THEIR MARKET STRUCTURES
Scenario No. of RN RN Comm. Reachability Outline of Solution
S1 Single Yes All RNs RN probes the market for optimal price to maximize its profit.
S2 Multiple Yes All RNs Price is determined by the second lowest MC of all RNs.
S3 Multiple Yes Subset Price is determined by the second lowest MC of the RNs a client can reach.
S4 Multiple No Subset Concurrent price probing by all the RNs (second lowest MC in equilibrium).
Property 1 (Truthful Reporting of Marginal Cost):
Under the second lowest marginal cost pricing
mechanism, each relaying node (RN) has incentive to
report its true marginal cost to the market. 5
Proof: We denote a RN’s true MC as , and its
reported value as . The lowest reported MC of all the
other RNs is 
 
. Now let’s focus on the RN’s reporting
strategy and its profit. There are two possibilities that the
RN can deviate from truthful reporting: under-reporting
and over-reporting.
Case of under-reporting: the reported MC is lower
than the true MC (i.e.  
 ). Now, consider the
following three possibilities: 1) If  
 
 
, the RN wins
the competition, and the outcome is exactly the same as
if the RN had reported the true MC, because the price
is determined by the second lowest MC which is  
 
. 2)
If  
 
 

 , although the RN wins the competition, it
has negative profit because the price  
 
is lower than its
true marginal cost. This is not a desirable outcome. 3)
If 
 

 

, the RN lost the competition, which is exactly
the same outcome as if it had reported the true MC.
Therefore, the RN has no incentive to under-report its
MC.
Case of over-reporting: the reported MC is higher
than the true MC (i.e.  
 ). Again consider the
following three possibilities: 1) If  
 
 
, the RN wins
the competition, and the outcome is exactly the same as
if the RN had reported the true MC, because the price
is determined by 
 
. 2) If  
 
 

 

, the RN loses the
competition and hence its profit is zero. It could have
won the competition by reporting its true MC and still
gain some positive profit since 
 
  . This is clearly
not a desirable outcome. 3) If 
 

 , the RN lost the
competition, which is exactly the same outcome as if
it had reported the true MC. Therefore, the RN has no
incentive to over-report its MC.
In summary, a RN gains more profit by reporting
its MC truthfully, no matter what the other RNs do.
Therefore, the RNs have incentive to report their true
MCs under this pricing mechanism.
5Note that we assume the RNs do not collude.
Under this market model, only the two RNs with
the lowest and the second lowest costs are needed to
maintain the price. As a result, other higher cost RNs
will refrain from announcing their costs in order to
reduce signaling overheads. However, they should still
keep monitoring the market to see whether their own
costs will be needed in the future, possibly due to the
departure of the current lowest cost RNs. When a RN
detects that it is the only RN in the network, it will switch
to monopoly mode (Scenario 1) and start to probe the
client(s) to maximize its profit.
D. Scenario 3
Scenario 3 differs from Scenario 2 in that each client
can only reach a subset of the RNs, i.e., a client may
not be able to use the service of the lowest cost RN. As
a result, the pricing mechanism in Scenario 2 does not
apply to this scenario. Note that the RNs are still aware
of each other’s price announcements.
We extend the second lowest MC pricing mechanism
to cover the subset reachability scenario here. That is,
the second lowest MC pricing mechanism is considered
only within the subset of RNs that the client can actually
reach. For example, if there are five RNs in the network
but a client can only reach three of them, the client has
only three choices. It should go to the lowest cost RN it
can reach, but pays the second lowest cost in the subset.
Intuitively, this is because if the lowest cost RN refuses
to serve the client, the client has to go to the second
lowest cost RN. Therefore, the lowest cost RN has the
“bargaining power” up to the second lowest cost, and
therefore should be able to ask for that price.
However, there are two outstanding problems in this
pricing mechanism. The first problem is that the client
should be prevented from making false claims of its
reachability to the RNs. For example, if a client can
reach a certain RN but later lost contact with it, the client
should not be allowed to make the claim any more. There
are a number of possible solutions to this problem, such
as using time-stamps or sequence numbers with digital
signatures. We choose to use a very simple technique.
That is, when a RN announces its MC to the network, it
6attaches a random number with the announcement. As a
result, if a client has lost contact with a RN, the RN’s
old announcements will become obsolete since the latest
announcement has a different random number. Since the
RNs can hear from each other’s announcements, they are
aware of the latest number. Therefore, a client cannot
make false claims about its reachability to the RNs. 6
Second, what if a client can only reach a single
RN? In our earlier scenarios (S1 and S2), we switch
between market probing (for S1) and second lowest
MC pricing (for S2) mechanisms, depending on the
number of RNs in the network. Here we must adopt these
two pricing mechanisms simultaneously with regard to
different clients. If a client can only reach a single RN,
the RN has monopolist power over the client and it can
resort to price probing for that client. 7 As we have
mentioned earlier, the client cannot lie about the set of
RNs it can reach.
E. Scenario 4
In this scenario, we relax the condition that the RNs
have communication among them, i.e., they are not
aware of each other’s price announcements. Without
further information about the market, each RN has to
probe the market individually to determine its optimal
pricing, similar to the hill-climbing method used in
Scenario 1. However, it is not clear whether concurrent
probing of the market is able to lead to an equilibrium
price.
To understand the dynamics of concurrent probing,
consider the competition between two RNs. The first RN
has cost 

and the second has cost 

, with 

 

.
To probe the market, each RN can use a price between
its MC and infinity. Since 

 

, there is always a
chance that the second RN can undercut the first RN’s
price. Then the first RN will eventually lower its price
to 

, but cannot go lower. When the second RN uses
a price between 

and 

, it gains the whole market
with positive profit. But if it ever tries to raise its price
higher than 

, it will lose the market and has to lower
its price again. In other words, 

serves as the upper-
bound for the second RN’s probing price. Ideally, the
second RN should set its price at 

. Using a fast and
accurate hill-climbing algorithm, the second RN should
arrive at an optimal price close to this value. Therefore,
the net outcome is that the market price is close to the
6If two nodes collude with each other to share the announcements,
it is still possible that a node can make false reachability claims.
A more sophisticated technique has to be designed to prevent such
collusion problem.
7Note that here the price probing is targeted at that client only, by
using unicast price announcements.
second lowest MC in equilibrium, which is similar to
the pricing mechanisms in S2 and S3. However, unlike
S2 and S3, this “correct” price has to be reached in a
probing process.
The analysis above underscores the importance of
keeping communication among the RNs. It helps the
market reach equilibrium instantly and keeps the market
price stable, which translates into higher profit for the
winning RN. Therefore, the BS should be persuaded
to act as intermediate for the RNs, possibly by using
a reward or profit-sharing mechanism.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section we conduct ns-2 simulations to evaluate
the different pricing mechanisms in a two-hop 802.11
wireless hotspot network. There are three types of nodes
in our simulation: base station (BS), relaying nodes
(RN), and clients. For simplicity, we use experiment
 	 to denote a simulated network scenario where
there are one BS,  RNs, and  clients. The clients try
to send constant bit rate (CBR) traffic to the BS via the
RNs. The RNs broadcast their pricing announcements to
the clients.
A. Price Probing by a Single RN
Price probing by a single RN via hill-climbing is
the pricing mechanism for Scenario 1 in Section III-B.
Here we evaluate the accuracy and convergence of the
algorithm by using two experiments: (1,1,1) and (1,1,5).
We use 0.001 as the accuracy threshold for the algorithm.
Experiment (1,1,1) is the simplest case with only one
client. The RN and the client’s parameters are shown
in Table II. The probing price of the RN is shown in
Figure 3. The figure clearly shows the two stages of
hill-climbing: fast probing in the first stage and quick
convergence in the second stage, which is similar to
Figure 11 in Appendix I. To implement hill-climbing in a
realistic scenario with network traffic, RN has to measure
the traffic for a certain period of time to calculate
its profit reliably. In our simulations, the time interval
between two price announcements is 15-30 seconds. The
final probing price after 34 climbing steps is 3.1614,
which is very close to the theoretic optimal price of
3.1623.
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS IN EXPERIMENT (1,1,1)
Cost of the RN 0.08
W of the client 0.008
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Fig. 3. RN’s hill-climbing probing price in Experiment (1,1,1).
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Fig. 4. RN’s hill-climbing probing price in Experiment (1,1,5).
Experiment (1,1,5) is to further evaluate the accuracy
and convergence of hill-climbing with multiple clients.
The simulation parameters are shown in Table III. The
RN’s probing price is shown in Figure 4. The final price
after 32 climbing steps is 1.1425, which is sufficiently
close to the theoretical optimal price of 1.1359. 8
TABLE III
SIMULATION PARAMETERS IN EXPERIMENT (1,1,5)
Cost of the RN 0.08
W of client 1-5 0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16
The hill-climbing process in the two experiments
above takes about 5-7 minutes. This can be improved
by one of the following techniques: 1) start from a price
higher than the MC; 2) use a larger initial step size;
and 3) shorten the probing interval. However, due to the
probing process, hill-climbing is best suited for a more
static network environment with a fixed set of clients.
8The theoretical optimal price for N clients can be derived as:
  

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
 
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where  is the cost of the RN, and 

(i = 1 to
N) correspond to the demand curves of the clients.
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Fig. 5. The pricing curves of the RNs in Experiment (1,3,1).
B. Second Lowest Marginal Cost Pricing Mechanism
Second lowest marginal cost is the pricing mechanism
for Scenario 2 in Section III-C. We will show an exper-
iment with (1,3,1), i.e., there are three RNs competing
for a client and they are aware of each other’s price
announcements. The simulation parameters are shown
in Table IV.
TABLE IV
SIMULATION PARAMETERS IN EXPERIMENT (1,3,1)
Cost of RN 1-3 0.08, 0.32, 0.78
W of the client 0.008
The RNs arrive with staggered times: 1) during time
0s to 220s, only 

is present in the network so that
it resorts to hill-climbing mechanism; 2) during time
220s to 410s, 

joins the network and they switch to
the second lowest MC pricing mechanism where 

wins the competition at the MC of 

; 3) during time
410s to 640s, 

joins the network so that three RNs
compete for the market where 

wins at the MC
of 

; 4) during time 640s to 830s, 

leaves the
network so that only 

and 

compete with each
other, where 

wins at the MC of 

; 5) during
time 830s to 1000s, 

leaves the network so that
 resumes its hill-climbing mechanism. The pricing
curves are shown in Figure 5. Since the market price can
be determined immediately using the second lowest MC
mechanism, it is suitable for a dynamic network with
high mobility.
The pricing mechanism for Scenario 3 in Section III-D
is similar to Scenario 2 and is omitted for brevity.
C. Concurrent Price Probing by Multiple RNs
Concurrent price probing is adopted when the RNs are
not aware of each other’s price announcements, which
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 
runs alone in Experiment (1,2,1).
corresponds to Scenario 4 in Section III-E. We will show
two experiments: (1,2,1) and (1,3,4).
Experiment (1,2,1) has a simple topology where there
are two RNs compete with each other for a single client.
The parameters are shown in Table V. The two RNs start
with staggered times: 

runs first (when it is a single
RN in the network), and 

joins later which disrupts


’s probing. After that, they probe concurrently. As
a comparison, we show in Figure 6 

’s probing price
 it runs alone, which gives a probing price of 5.9233
(theoretical optimal is 5.9161). When the two RNs probe
concurrently, their prices are shown in Figure 7. Before


joins at time 170s, 

probes alone which jumps
the price really high. After 

joins, since it has a
lower MC, its initial probing price is lower, which lets
it win over the client. At this point, 

drops its price
to approximately its MC, however, it still cannot attract
the client. At a certain point, for example at time 290s
when 

reaches 

’s MC, 

cannot continue to
climb higher because that would allow 

to regain
the market. Then 

starts to cut its price, and this
competition starts over in cycles at equilibrium. The
overall effect is that 

has to keep a price lower than


’s MC (which is the second lowest MC), but it is
trying to get to that price as close as possible.
TABLE V
SIMULATION PARAMETERS IN EXPERIMENT (1,2,1)
Cost of RN 1-2 0.28, 0.08
W of the client 0.008
Experiment (1,3,4) investigates a more complicated
case where each client can only reach a subset of the
RNs. The topology is shown in Figure 8: client 4 and
5 can reach 

and 

; client 6 and 7 can reach


and 

. The simulation parameters are shown
in Table VI. The concurrent probing of the three RNs
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Fig. 8. Topology of experiment (1,3,4)
is shown in Figure 9. The figure shows that when 

climbs higher than 

’s MC (such as at time 100s), it
starts to lose market and it has to cut its price, which is
similar to Experiment (1,2,1). However, one important
difference is that 

still keeps client 6 and 7, which
allows 

to finish its hill-climbing approximately at
time 200s. If there were no competition from 

, 

would have ended up at a higher price. To let 

finish at the highest possible price, we let 

climb
again after a certain period. Figure 9 shows that 

eventually climbs to a price close to 

’s MC (which
is the second lowest MC). Compared to Scenario 2 and
3, converging to the second lowest MC is much more
difficult and requires a lengthy probing process, during
which the wining RN loses certain profit it could have
acquired. Therefore, this underscores the importance of
keeping communication among the RNs.
TABLE VI
SIMULATION PARAMETERS IN EXPERIMENT (1,3,4)
Cost of RN 1-3 1.02, 0.08, 2.10
W of client 4-7 0.008, 0.012, 0.016, 0.028
D. Summary of Results and Additional Comments
We evaluate the pricing mechanisms in different net-
work scenarios. In Scenario 1, we show that the proposed
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hill-climbing algorithm is reasonably quick and can
converge very closely to the optimal value. In Scenario
2 and 3, we show that the VCG-like second lowest MC
pricing mechanism can determine the market price in-
stantly without going through the hill-climbing process.
In Scenario 4, we show that a concurrent hill-climbing
process can reach approximately the second lowest MC
at equilibrium. To maintain stable pricing, it is beneficial
for the RNs to keep communication among them.
V. RELATED WORK
Our work in this paper is related to the following
research areas: 1) multihop wireless hotspot network, 2)
multihop cellular network, 3) cooperation in multihop ad
hoc network (MANET), and 4) algorithmic mechanism
design in distributed systems. Below we discuss the
related work in each of these areas.
Multihop wireless hotspot network [1]–[4] has been
recently proposed to extend the coverage area of a
base station, especially when using a high-rate short-
range radio such as IEEE 802.11a. In [3], an enhanced
MAC layer protocol is designed to increase multihop
performance by using multiple channels. In [4], transport
layer mechanisms are designed to achieve end-to-end
throughput and delay assurances via service differentia-
tion. All these studies have focused on improving system
performance, but have not considered the incentive prob-
lem of packet forwarding. Therefore, our work in this
paper can be considered as a pilot study in this direction.
A multihop cellular network [5]–[9] is similar in
concept to the multihop hotspot network. However, the
base stations in a multihop cellular network are usually
owned by a single operator and can be trusted. All the
mobile terminals belong to the same cellular provider,
and the provider can reward the terminals for multihop
packet forwarding. In [7] a probabilistic charging scheme
is designed to reduce the overhead of repeated micro-
payments, while in [8] the charge is based on a session
to further reduce the charging overhead. In [9] security
mechanisms are designed to protect the authenticity of
the forwarding path in order to ensure accurate account-
ing and payments. All these schemes require the cellular
base station to act as a trusted party. However, in a
spontaneous multihop hotspot network, the wireless base
station does not have any business relationship with the
mobile clients. The mobile clients may not be customers
of the hotspot network provider. Therefore, we cannot
rely on the wireless base station to collect payments.
Instead, we model the multihop system as a market
involving the relaying nodes, which is a more general
model than the existing models for multihop cellular
network.
Similar to multihop hotspot and cellular networks,
cooperation in a multihop ad hoc network (MANET) is
very important. Its impact has been quantitative studied
in [26]. As mentioned in Section II-A, the existing ap-
proaches include game theory based approach [10]–[16]
and credit (or micro-payment) based approach [17]–[20].
In [17] and [18], a tamper-resistant hardware module
is used to enforce the charging and crediting of packet
forwarding, while in [19] a software-based charging
scheme is designed such that cheating is not desirable. In
[20], a charging scheme is proposed based on an auction
model at each router. Our work in this paper differs from
[20] in two important aspects: 1) our scheme in this
paper allows selecting different relaying nodes for packet
forwarding, while in [20] only a pre-set multihop path
is allowed; and 2) our scheme in this paper considers
the whole network as a market, while in [20] the market
is contained within each router since a MANET-wide
market will have to involve heavy multihop signaling
overheads.
Finally, the recent development of many new types of
distributed systems often involves self-interested parties
over the network, such as peer-to-peer resource sharing,
ad hoc networks, pervasive computing, computational
grids and overlay networks. As a result, the concept of
truthful or strategy-proof computing has been proposed
to stimulate each participant to follow a prescribed proto-
col without deviation via algorithmic mechanism designs
[25], [27]–[30]. For example, a VCG-based mechanism
has been utilized for BGP routers [31] and MANET
routing [32]. In this paper, the second lowest marginal
cost pricing mechanism (in Section III-C) is another
example of using algorithmic mechanism design in a
distributed system with selfish agents.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we focus on the packet forwarding
incentive problem in a two-hop wireless hotspot network.
We adopt the credit (or micro-payment) based incentive
approach, i.e., the clients pay the relaying nodes for
their packet forwarding service. We model the system
as a market where the pricing for packet forwarding
is determined by demand and supply. We classify the
network into four different scenarios, and propose differ-
ent pricing solutions for each of them. In particular, we
design a hill-climbing algorithm for a monopoly market,
and introduce a VCG-like second lowest marginal cost
pricing mechanism for a market with multiple relaying
nodes which guarantees truthful reporting of marginal
costs. We further extend the network scenarios to cover
the situation where a client can only reach a subset of the
relaying nodes, and another situation where the relaying
nodes do not have communication among them. Our sim-
ulation results show that the pricing mechanisms are able
to guide the market into an equilibrium state quickly.
Our analysis in this paper underscores the importance
of keeping communication among the relaying nodes,
therefore, the base station should be encouraged to act
as intermediate to reliably relay pricing messages among
them.
APPENDIX I
HILL-CLIMBING ALGORITHM IN SCENARIO 1
In this section we discuss in detail the hill-climbing
algorithm to find an optimal price to maximize RN’s
profit. Our algorithm is a general algorithm which does
not rely on the exact shape of the profit function, as long
as the function has a single “peak”. Before starting, the
RN needs to specify an accuracy threshold 
 
  	
to serve as the condition to terminate the algorithm. Our
algorithm consists of the following two stages.
The first stage performs a coarse but fast probing to
locate a price region where  should belong to. The
incremental step size  is doubled each time to quickly
encompass the optimal price. The algorithm starts at the
RN’s marginal cost. It stops when the profit starts to
decrease, i.e., it has crossed the “peak” of the profit
function. During the searching process, the algorithm
maintains three prices:  

,  

and  

, where  


  



 

and  	 

	 
  	 

	 
  	 

	.
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When the first stage terminates, the following conditions
should hold:  	 

	 
  	 

	,  	 

	 

 	 

	, and    

  

	. At the end of this stage,
it can only have one of the following two possibilities
9For simplicity, it is assumed that 
    .
B
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1P
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d 2d
P2
P
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Fig. 10. Two possibilities after the first stage.
(shown in Figure 10): either  

  (Case A) or
 


  (Case B). The next stage will try to narrow down
the target price region  

  

	 using  

as the pivot.
Pseudo-code of the first stage is shown in Table VII.
TABLE VII
FIRST STAGE OF HILL-CLIMBING
/* Stage 1 */
  ;
 
 
 
 ; /* start from the cost */
 

  
 
  ;    ;
 

  

  ;    ;
   

    

  
 
 
  

;
 

  

;
 

  

  ;    ;

The second stage searches the price region  

  

	
by first checking the mid-point  

of  

and  

( 

 





). Suppose  

  

(the case of  


  

is sim-
ilar). If  	 

	   	 

	, use  

to replace
 

and  

to replace  

; otherwise, use  

to replace
 

. That is, the algorithm always maintains the following
conditions:  


  


  

,  	 

	 
  	 

	,
 	 

	 
  	 

	, and    

  

	. In case
 

   

, we choose  

to be the one-third point
between  

and  

( 

 





). This binary search
process repeats until the target region is smaller than the
pre-set accuracy threshold ( 

  

 
). Pseudo-code
of the second stage is shown in Table VIII.
In summary, the first stage of hill-climbing performs a
coarse but fast search to locate the price region where the
optimal price should belong to. The step size is doubled
each time to accelerate the process. In the second stage,
a binary search is conducted using a pivot ( 

) to narrow
down the target price region. The program stops when
the pre-set accuracy threshold is reached.
As an example, for a demand curve with    ,
   , and 
   , the hill-climbing algorithm
reaches its optimal price 3.16233 after 28 steps, which
is very close to the theoretical optimal value of 3.16228.
11
TABLE VIII
SECOND STAGE OF HILL-CLIMBING
/* Stage 2 */
  

  
 
   
 

  
 
  

 ;
  

  

  
   

    

  
 

  

;

  
 
 
  

;
 

  

;


  
  

    

  
 

   
 
  

 ;

   

    

  
 
 
  

;

  
 

  

;
 

  

;



   

;
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Fig. 11. Example of a hill-climbing process.
In fact, the price is already very close to the optimal
value after 19 steps (see Fig. 11). The figure also clearly
shows the fast probing (in the first stage from time 0 to
12) and quick converging (in the second stage from time
13 to 28) properties of our algorithm.
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